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NOTES
PRISONERS' SUITS FOR MONEY DAMAGES:
AN EXCEPTION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Allen W. Burton*
INTRODUCTION

Only Russia has a higher incarceration rate than the United States.'
At year-end 1999, one in every 110 men in the United States was an
inmate in either a federal or state prison, 2 From 1990 to 1999, the
total prison population of state, federal, and local institutions
increased by more than 742,000 inmates,3 and these inmates are
remaining in prison for longer portions of their sentences due to
decreased opportunity for parole.4 The total number of prisoners in
state and federal correctional facilities is rapidly approaching two
million.5
Along with this dramatic rise in the prison population, and to a
large extent because of it,6 the number of lawsuits filed by prisoners in
* This Note is dedicated to my parents. my siblings, and my wife, Beth, for their
constant support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Katherine
Franke, Fordham School of Law, for her guidance.
1. Ted Conover, GuardingSing Sing, New Yorker, Apr. 3,2000, at 55,57.
2. Allen J. Beck, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoners in 1999, at 1,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslpubalp2.htm#prisoners
(Aug.
2000)
[hereinafter
Prisoners in 1999]. Even more striking is the rate at which young black males are
incarcerated. As of 1999, one in every eleven black men age twenty-five to twentynine was in prison, compared to one in thirty-two Hispanic men and one in ninety-one
white men in the same age group. Id. at 9. Approximately one in three "black
men... between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine (are] either incarcerated or on
probation or parole." Conover. supra note 1. at 57.
3. Prisonersin 1999, supra note 2, at 2.
4. John Sullivan, In New York and Nation, Chances for Early ParoleShrink, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 23, 2000, at 29.
5. Prisonersin 1999, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners § 2.12, at 98 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that
"overcrowding has been a major topic for prison litigation"); see Prisoners in 1999,
supra note 2, at 9 (reporting that as of 1999, twenty-two state prison systems were
operating at "100% or more of their highest capacity" and federal prisons were
operating at 32% above capacity).
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federal court has also increased. As the Supreme Court recognized:
"What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with
his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker
becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State."7 From 1980 to
1996. the number of petitions filed annually by state and federal
inmates in federal court increased nearly threefold, from 23,230 to
68,235.8

The increase in prisoners' lawsuits has been met with judicial
restrictions, media disapproval, and legislative action. 9 While the
Supreme Court acknowledged prisoners' rights in the 1960s and 1970s,
and lower courts robustly enforced them, the current federal judiciary
has returned to the more "hands-off" approach of prior years.'
Recent decisions have displayed a lack of sympathy for civil rights
claims brought by inmates." In addition, because many suits lack
colorable legal claims, prisoners' lawsuits on the whole are portrayed
as frivolous, serving only to clog the dockets of the federal courtsY
This portrayal has fueled a perception that prisoners'
ability to bring
13
suits has spun out of control and must be curbed.
In response to this outcry, Congress took a far-reaching step to limit
prisoners' ability to bring lawsuits into federal court. 4 On April 26,
1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the
"PLRA"). 15 In an effort to ease the burden of prisoners' lawsuits on
the federal docket, the PLRA places heavy restrictions on prisoners'
access to the courts. 6 Such restrictions include: (1) barring suits by
inmate plaintiffs who have previously filed three petitions dismissed as
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a cause of action; 7 (2) revoking
a prisoner's earned release credit for filing a frivolous claim;" (3)

7. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
8. John Scalia, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoner Petitions in the Federal Courts,
1980-96, at iii, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ppfc96.txt (Oct. 1997)
[hereinafter PrisonerPetitions].
9. See infra Part I.

10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and
the Supreme Court in Dialogue,77 Or. L. Rev. 1229, 1252-68 (1998).
12. See id. at 1229-30; infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text; see also Nyhuis v.
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that federal courts should not "waste
their time" considering whether administrative processes will provide inmate civil
rights plaintiffs with the remedies they seek).
13. As former Senator Bob Dole remarked: "[Pirisoners will now 'litigate at the
drop of a hat,' simply because they have little to lose and everything to gain." 141
Cong. Rec. 10, 14570 (1995) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
14. See infra Part I.B.

15. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110
Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1932, 1346;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. IV 1998)).
16. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
18. Id. § 1932.
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allowing sua sponte dismissals of any claim that fails to state a cause of
action;19 and (4) requiring prisoners to exhaust "available"
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court.'1
Although the PLRA's drafters aimed to reduce the strain of
litigation brought by prisoners on federal courts, 1 there has been
considerable litigation regarding its constitutionality and application.?
As a result, the PLRA has also generated significant scholarly
commentary, especially among student commentators. "More
19. Id. § 1915A(b).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); infra Part II.
21. 141 Cong. Rec. 19, 26552 (1995), see also 141 Cong. Rec. 10, 14572 (1995)
(reporting Senator Kyl's statement that "inmate suits are clogging the courts and
draining precious judicial resources").
22- See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990. 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding the
provision limiting attorneys' fees against due process, separation of powers, and equal
protection challenges); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F3d 178, 187 (3d Cir.
1999) (finding that the PLRA does not impermissibly restrict the remedial power of
the federal courts); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding
the PLRA's three strikes provision on equal protection and due process grounds);
Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1181-85 (9th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with other
circuits and finding unconstitutional the PLRA's provision allowing immediate
termination of prison consent decrees), vacated as noot, 181 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc); Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1297-301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that
the PLRA's requirement that prisoners proceeding in forina pauperis must pay
installed filing fees survives due process, access to the courts, and equal protection
challenges); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse. 129 F.3d 649, 652-53 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding that PLRA's consent decree termination provision survives due
process challenge).
23. See, e.g., Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes
and You're Out of Court-It May Be Effective, but is it Constitutional?,70 Temp. L
Rev. 471,509-10 (1997) (discussing the constitutionality of the PLRA); Jason E. Pepe,
Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners' Constitutional Rights:
Equal Protectionand the Prison Litigation Refform Act, 23 Hamline L Rev. 58, 63-80
(1999) (focusing on the PLRA's physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e) and
concluding that it is unconstitutional); James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37
Harv. J. on Legis. 105, 107 (2000) (arguing that the physical injury requirement
violates the equal protection clause): Richard J. Costa, Note. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: A Legitimate Attempt to CurtailFrivolous Inmate Lawsuits and
End the Alleged Micro-Managemnent of State Prisons or a Violation of Separation of
Powers?, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 319, 348-65 (1997) (arguing that "[tihe PLRA
[ujnconstitutionally [vliolates the [d]octrine of [sleparation of [plowers"); Sharon 1.
Fiedler, Comment, Past Wrongs, Present Futilit. and the Future of Prisoner Relief:
ReasonableInterpretationof "Available" in the Contert of the PLRA. 33 U.C. Davis L
Rev. 713, 740-50 (2000) (proposing a narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement
of the PLRA); Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking
the Balance Between Law and Order.44 Vill. L. Rev. 981. 984-1012 (1999) (providing
analysis of each challenged provision of the PLRA and the constitutionality of the
PLRA as a whole); Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note. The End of the Prison Law Firm?:
Frivolous Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 29 Rutgers L.J. 361, 361 (1998) ("This Note argues that the PLRA is a
necessary Congressional measure designed to rectify serious problems surrounding
the federal courts' involvement with state prison inmates."); Stacey Heather O'Bryan,
Note, Closing the CourthouseDoor: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Refortn Act's
Physical Injury Requirement on tie Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,83 Va. L. Rev.
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specifically, the PLRA's requirement of administrative exhaustion has
caused particular problems for courts,24 and two situations have
generated inconsistent results: (1) prisoners' suits for money damages
where such damages are unavailable in the prison grievance
program;2 and (2) prisoners'
excessive force claims brought under the
26
Amendment.
Eighth
This Note addresses the first of these situations and proposes that
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement should not apply where the
administrative process cannot provide the prisoner's only requested
1189, 1193 (1997) ("This Note concludes that the physical injury requirement does
little to halt the filing of frivolous claims by federal prisoners, but may impose
impermissible obstacles on the vindication of state prisoners' constitutional rights.");
Catherine G. Patsos, Note, The Constitutionality and Implications of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 205, 208 (1998) ("This note will argue
that the Prison Litigation Reform Act... is unconstitutional."); Ricardo Solano, Jr.,
Note, Is Congress Handcuffing Our Courts?, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 282, 310 (1997)
(focusing on the PLRA's limitation on federal courts' relief and concluding that "the
PLRA deals a heavy blow to the principles of democracy that govern our nation").
24. See infra Part II.C. One student commentator has directly addressed the
exhaustion provision. Fiedler, supra note 23, at 719 (proposing that courts excuse the
exhaustion requirement when prisoners sue based on "past wrongs" and the remedy
they seek is unavailable in the administrative process). Like Fiedler, this Note also
argues for an exception to the exhaustion requirement, but it does not ask courts to
determine whether the nature of the claim is "past" or "ongoing." See infra Part III.
25. See, e.g., Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "[t]he
law concerning the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is in great flux," with respect to
cases involving excessive force and those seeking money damages); Rumbles v. Hill,
182 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[a]uthorities are split" on the
question of whether suits for money damages where such damages are not provided
by the grievance system are subject to § 1997e(a)); see also infra note 167 (listing cases
that illustrate the judicial conflict over § 1997e(a) and prisoners' suits for money
damages).
26. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. Courts have differed over whether excessive force claims must be
subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, which applies only to actions brought
"with respect to prison conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998). Compare
Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the exhaustion
requirement applies to excessive force claims); Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 890-91
(5th Cir. 1998) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in an excessive force
claim but not explicitly deciding whether such claims fall within § 1997e(a)); Garrett
v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1264-66 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 98 Civ. 9009, 2000 WL 347155, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (same);
Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); Beeson v. Fishkill
Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 888-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same), with Nussle v.
Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that "§ 1997e(a) does not encompass
particular instances of excessive force or assault"); Tolliver v. Wilson, No. 99 Civ.
9555, 2000 WL 1154311, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (exhaustion not required);
Giannattasio v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 7606, 2000 WL 335242, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2000) (same); Royster v. United States, No. 98 Civ. 4109, 1999 WL 1567734, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1999) (same); Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (same); Carter v. Kiernan, No. 98 Civ. 2664, 1999 WL 14014, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 1999) (same); Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL 778396, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998) (same).
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remedy. 27 This issue is especially acute now2 because the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari on a case that may decide the issue." In
Booth v. Churner,0 the Third Circuit dismissed the inmate plaintiff's
civil rights claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, even
though the administrative process could not have supplied the
monetary relief he sought." Booth represents the culmination of a
debate that has stewed in the courts since the enactment of the PLRA.
The Court's decision is likely to have a significant impact on future
prisoner litigation and federal courts' application of the PLRA? 2
Part I of this Note explains the justifications for and the enactment
of the PLRA. In addition, Part I discusses the scholarly criticism and
judicial confusion generated by the PLRA. Part II explores the
specific controversy in the courts over the application of the PLRA's
requirement that claims be exhausted administratively. This part first
explains the underlying doctrine of administrative exhaustion, and
then discusses the particular requirement of the PLRA. Further, Part
II illustrates the split among the federal circuits on whether the
requirement should apply when inmates seek money damages that are
unavailable through the administrative procedure. Finally, Part III
offers a solution to the problem created by the exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA. This Note concludes that the Supreme
Court should decide this issue by allowing an exception to the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA 33
To be clear, this Note does not argue that required exhaustion is
altogether unfair. Indeed, its potential benefits are significant.-"
Prisoners must not, however, be forced to comply with procedures
that cannot satisfy their claims.
The exhaustion requirement
therefore should not apply to cases in which prisoners seek exclusively
monetary damages and such damages are not available in the
applicable prison grievance procedure.

27. See infra Part III.
28. Fiedler discusses the judicial conflict in cases decided in 1997 and 1998.
Fiedler, supra note 23, at 725-33. Since that time, additional circuits have addressed
the issue, but still no consensus has emerged. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d
Cir. 2000); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 201 F.3d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 2000); Massey v.
Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 732-35 (7th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643
(6th Cir. 1999); infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
29. Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the narrow

"futility exception" to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement recognized by the Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 377 (2000).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Wright, 201 F.3d at 666 (characterizing the "exceptional importance" of
the issue while requesting an en banc hearing).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
The PLRA represents Congress' latest effort to restrict prisoners'
access to federal court. This effort and the current restrictions facing
prisoners' lawsuits are part of the evolving area of prisoners' rights.
Locating the current status of prisoner litigation within the historical
evolution of prisoners' suits more generally in the latter half of the
twentieth century enhances an analysis of the PLRA's effect.
Accordingly, this part traces the evolution of prisoners' rights up to
the enactment of the PLRA. This part also examines the PLRA itself,
considering both its justifications and its effect.
A. The Evolution of Prisoners'Civil Rights Claims in Federal Court
Recognition of the constitutional rights of prisoners is a recent
development in American law. 5 In the nineteenth century, convicts
were thought of as slaves.36 State legislatures enacted civil death
statutes, which deprived prisoners of all civil rights37 and denied
criminals even the ability to litigate their own "slave status."3 Despite
the absence of a federal civil death statute, federal courts imposed a
judicial counterpart throughout the first part of the twentieth century
by denying all constitutional claims by prisoners.39 This approach,
termed the "hands-off doctrine,"4 denied jurisdiction to such claims
because courts saw no room for the judiciary to "supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules."4 1 The
only role seen for the courts was "to deliver from imprisonment those
who are illegally confined."42 Aside from habeas corpus petitions,
even 43litigants with meritorious constitutional violations were turned
away.

35. Mushlin, supra note 6, § 1.00, at 4.
36. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (describing
prisoners as slaves "in a state of penal servitude to the State"). Indeed, incarceration
was not a primary means of punishment in early American criminal law. Other
sanctions such as capital punishment, corporal punishment and banishment were
more common. Roberta M. Harding, In the Belly of the Beast: A Comparison of the
Evolution and Status of Prisoners' Rights in the United States and Europe, 27 Ga. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 7 (1998).
37. Walter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a
CriminalConviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 949-50 (1970).
38. Herman, supra note 11, at 1238.
39. See id.
40. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review
the Complaintsof Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506, 506 (1963).
41. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771,771 (10th Cir. 1954).
42. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1951). The Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Ex parte Hull marked the Court's first recognition of a prisoner's
right, finding that "the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546, 549 (1941).
43. See, e.g., Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 287, 290 (D. Alaska 1951)
(denying a claim despite noting that the prison conditions were a "fabulous
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In the 1960s, federal courts began to depart from the "hands-off
doctrine." During this period, courts overlooked the concerns of
separation of powers, federalism, and lack of judicial expertise in the
field of prison administration that had supplied the doctrine's legal
justifications.' The Supreme Court formally rejected the doctrine,
recognizing that "there is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country."45 In response, courts
began to enforce the rights of the incarcerated, refusing to turn a blind
eye to the inhumane conditions in some prisons." This "prisoners'
rights revolution '47 saw courts treating prisoners as a "discrete and
insular minority"' and regularly enforcing their newly recognized
constitutional rights.
The most basic of these rights was access to the courts. As the
Seventh Circuit noted in Adams v. Carlson: "All other rights of an
inmate are illusory without it."50 This recognition of prisoners' access
to the courts paved the way for a dramatic increase in litigation
brought by prisoners. From 1970 to 1986, the total number of civil
rights filings in federal court made by prisoners of state institutions
increased nearly tenfold, from 2,030 to 20,072.11 It is important to
note, however, that prisoners were not the only civil rights plaintiffs
increasing in numbers. The number of civil rights cases filed by nonprisoners in federal court also increased, from 296 in 1961 to 13,168 in
1979.52
obscenity").
44. Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and CorrectionalReform: An Analysis of
the Decline of the "Hands-Off"Doctrine, 1977 Detroit C. L Rev. 795, 796-97. These
traditional legal justifications included: (1) separation of powers; (2) considerations of
federalism; (3) the judiciary's lack of expertise; (4) concerns about undermining
prison administration; and (5) fear of opening the floodgates to prisoner litigation. Id.
at 797.
45. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
46. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1978) (describing an Arkansas
prison as a "dark and evil world" in which up to ten or eleven inmates, some
contagious, were confined in an eight by ten foot unfurnished cell, given inadequate
food, and punished with leather straps and electrical shocks); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318, 328-29 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (finding Eighth Amendment violations in
Alabama's prison system); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1972)
(awarding injunctive relief because the prison was "'maintained and operated in a
manner violative of rights secured to inmates by the United States Constitution").
47. Herman, supra note 11, at 1239.
48. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (describing
groups whose constitutional rights most require judicial protection).
49. 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 630.
51. Jim Thomas, Prisoner Litigation: The Paradox of the Jailhouse Lawyer 58
(1988). For a discussion of the factors contributing to why prisoners sue, see William
Bennett Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the
Federal Courts,92 Harv.L. Rev. 610,625-37 (1979).
52. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 523 (1982). Further, between 1973 and 1981, nearly
60% of the increase in all civil rights case filings resulted from employment
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In the 1980s, the Supreme Court followed a conservative ideological
shift and backed away from its rights-enforcing role to adopt one
more similar to the "hands-off" approach. 3 The Court's decisions
imposed restrictions on inmates' constitutional claims, seeking to
enforce rights established by earlier decisions. 4 In Rhodes v.
Chapman,5 for example, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's finding
that a prison's double-ceiling policy violated the inmates' Eighth
Amendment rights. 6 While the Court acknowledged that the prison's
policies were "harsh," they were simply "part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses."57

This "modified hands-off' approach exhibited in Rhodes continued
to be the Court's favored approach into the 1990s. Recently, the
Court secured its commitment to this restrictive approach with its
1996 decision in Lewis v. Casey." In Lewis, twenty-two inmates from
Arizona prisons brought a class action suit claiming that the prison
libraries were inadequate to ensure their constitutional right of access
to the courts.5 9 The Court rejected their claim, declaring that
prisoners need to have only minimally adequate legal support.60 Thus,
while not disputing that prisoners have a constitutional right of access
to the courts, the Court restricted prisoners' ability to exercise that
right effectively.6 This restriction illustrates the contrast between the
Court's current approach to prisoners' civil rights claims and the
Court's approach in the 1960s and 1970s.
B. CongressSteps In
Despite the Court's modern restrictive approach, the volume of
prisoners' lawsuits filed annually in federal court ballooned to 68,235
by 1996 6 2-an increase of over 426% from 1970.63 Currently, 15% of
civil suits filed in the courts of the United States are filed by
discrimination cases. Id. at 535.
53. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1245-46.
54. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342. 349-53 (1987) (applying
rational basis review to a prison regulation which allegedly restricted the free exercise
of religion); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (applying a general
reasonableness standard to prisoners' First Amendment claims); Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 472-77 (1983) (requiring only minimal due process before confinement in
administrative segregation); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-52 (1981) (finding
no Eighth Amendment violation in the prison's double-ceiling policy).
55. 452 U.S. at 337.
56. Id. at 352.
57. Id. at 347.

58.
59.
60.
61.

518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 346-47.
See id. at 351-53.
See Herman, supra note 11, at 1262-63.

62. PrisonerPetitions,supra note 8, at iii.

63. Thomas, supra note 51, at 61 (reporting that in 1970 the number of prisoners'
petitions filed in federal court was 15,997).

2001]

PRISONER SUITS FOR MONEY DAMAGES

1367

prisoners. 64 As more suits have entered federal court, however, fewer
have resulted favorably for prisoners. According to the National
Association of Attorneys General, more than 95% of inmate civil
rights suits are dismissed in favor of the defendant." Courts are understandably frustrated by this high number of
unsuccessful cases.' Courts also complain about the frivolous and
seemingly unimportant nature of some of the claims."' For example,
prisoners have alleged civil rights violations resulting from
deprivations of shampoo and deodorant, denial of a second serving
of ice cream,69 the issuance of Converse rather than L.A. Gear brand
athletic shoes, 70 and restrictions on the opportunity to pitch
horseshoes.71 An oft-highlighted case is one where an inmate pointed
to the prison's failure to serve him his preferred style of peanut butter
(chunky, not creamy). 2
Commentators were justifiably concerned about the effect of
increasing numbers of prisoners' suits on the overly-burdened federal
docket.73 Additionally, many, if not most, petitions filed by prisoners
are legally frivolous.74 However, commentary often fails to tell the
64. Hobart, supra note 23, at 981.
65. 141 Cong. Rec. 19,26552-53 (1995).
66. See Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) ("The
sheer volume of these prisoners' cases causes extreme frustration and hardship for all
who deal with them.").
67. See, e.g., Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (noting that
courts are "drowning in frivolous prisoner complaints"); see also Thomas, supra note
51, at 67 (describing the conception that prisoners file frivolous suits and quoting
Chief Justice Warren Burger as instructing federal courts to dismiss -minor"
complaints by prisoners).
68. Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316, 1316 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also Eugene J.
Kuzinski, supra note 23, at 365-66 (collecting frivolous cases).
69. Lyell v. Schachle, No. 1-95-0035, 1996 WL 391557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28,
1996).
70. See Press Release, Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act Clears Congress (Apr. 26, 1996) availableat 1996 WL 8786243.
71. See Ben L. Kaufman, Can Judge Reject Inmate Suit?, Cincinnati Enquirer,
Aug. 1, 1999, at C6.
72. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. 1, 19 (1997). More examples of these types of
claims are not hard to come by. See Thomas, supra note 51, at 67 (citing examples of
extreme cases including complaints of cold toilet seats and a failure to provide outside
television antennae).
73. Herman, supra note 11, at 1295 (explaining that the portion of the federal
docket occupied by prisoner suits is "hefty"); see also supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text (presenting statistics illustrating the heavy volume of prisoners'
petitions in federal court).
74. The difference between legal frivolousness and substantive frivolousness is
noteworthy. A legally frivolous complaint lacks an arguable basis in law. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Examples of legally frivolous claims include those
where the defendant is obviously immune and those where a claimant alleges
infringement of a legal interest that does not exist. Id. at 327. On the other hand,
substantive or factually frivolous claims involve "'fanciful,' 'fantastic' and
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whole story. The gross number of lawsuits relates directly to the size
of the prison population. Any measurement of the litigation increase
must therefore include the number of lawsuits filed as a percentage of
the prison population. Surprisingly, even though the rise of total
prisoners' lawsuits has been startling, the rate at which prisoners file
such lawsuits has declined 17% between 1980 and 1996, from 72.7
petitions per one thousand inmates to 60.5.
Moreover, portrayal of this class of suits as completely devoid of

merit is not always accurate. As Judge Newman of the Second Circuit
pointed out, frivolous claims characterized as "typical" are often not
frivolous at all.76 In the famous "chunky peanut butter case," for
example, the inmate actually sued because his prison account had
been incorrectly debited for a jar of peanut butter he never received. 77
Likewise, in a case characterized as one where prisoners sued because7
there were "no salad bars or brunches on weekends and holidays,
the actual complaint concerned unhealthy prison conditions including
overcrowding, forced confinement for prisoners with contagious
diseases, lack of proper ventilation, lack of sufficient food, and food
contaminated by rodents.79 The salad bar claim was included in a
broader claim of nutritional deprivation and was mentioned merely
"in passing."8
Nevertheless, media attention given to these cases generated public
outcry against prisoner litigation.81 Coverage accurately revealed that
many cases are indeed without merit and only burden the dockets of
federal courts.'

While this portrayal was often warranted, the

coverage consistently failed to mention legitimate claims." This focus
'delusional"' allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations
omitted) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 325, 328). While the mass media focuses
on cases that are substantively frivolous, dismissals for legal frivolousness are far
more common. Jeffrey R. Maahs & Rolando V. Del Carmen, Curtailing Frivolous
Section 1983 Inmate Litigation: Laws, Practices, and Proposals, 59 Fed. Probation,
Dec. 1995, at 53 (1995) (citing a recent study which found that only 19% of § 1983
suits are dismissed for substantive frivolousness).
75. Prisoner Petitions, supra note 8, at 5. Further, the filing rate for federal
inmates filing civil rights claims declined 53% between 1985 and 1995. Id.
76. Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se PrisonerLitigation:Looking for Needles in Haystacks,
62 Brook. L. Rev. 519, 521 (1996).
77. Id. at 521-22.
78. Id. at 520 (quoting Denis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free Courts
from FrivolousPrisonerSuits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1995, at A3).
79. Id. at 521.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Harold W. Andersen, Frivolous Jailhouse Lawsuits Cost Nebraska,
Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 11, 1999, at 13B (listing examples of frivolous lawsuits
and explaining that it is "surely a serious matter").
82. See supra notes 66-74.
83. In a recent case worth noting, a jury verdict dismissing an Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim in the Southern District of New York was held to be "against
the weight of the evidence presented at trial." Ruffin v. Fuller, No. 99 Civ. 1679, 2000
WL 1886615, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28 2000). Judge Chin was "convinced" that a
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on claims that seem almost humorous' has distorted the public's view.
The result is an overall negative public perception of prisoners'

petitions, unbalanced by the lack of attention given to those petitions
that are meritorious85

In response, Congress developed and enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 6 to address the "alarming explosion in the
number of lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners."' s The
PLRA built upon the 1980 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act' ("CRIPA"), Congress' first major piece of prisoners' rights
legislation. CRIPA sought to enforce prisoners' rights by authorizing
the United States Attorney General to litigate claims on behalf of

inmates. 9 In addition, CRIPA sought to reduce the number of
petitions filed in federal court by requiring prisoners to exhaust
"plain, speedy, and effective" administrative remedies before bringing
suit in court.9
The PLRA expands CRIPA's goal of reducing the number of
federal petitions filed by prisoners by sharply restricting the manner in
which prisoners may engage in litigation. Specifically, the PLRA
restricts prisoners through: (1) a "three-strikes" provision which bars
plaintiffs who have filed three petitions dismissed as frivolous,

prison guard had kicked the prisoner in the mouth, shattering the prisoner's teeth. Id.
84. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 81 (including the 1995 "top 10" list for
frivolous lawsuits brought by inmates and their "laughable" contents).
85. Herman, supra note 11, at 1230 (noting the effect of "fairly consistent media
coverage" on the public perception of prisoners). The public perception of prisoner
litigation can generally be compared to that of non-prisoner personal injury tort
litigation. See generally Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World: Inages, Issues, and
Idols in the Debate over Tort Reform, 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 701, 703 (1997) (discussing
the impact of images on the debate over tort reform). The public views prisoners'
suits as similar to the McDonald's hot coffee case, in which an elderly woman sued
after spilling a cup of hot coffee that she had placed between her legs at a McDonald's
drive-thru. See id. at 718-24 (discussing Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994)). The S2.9 million verdict
attracted negative media attention, sparked Congressional tort reform debate, and
even supplied comic material for the television show Seinfeld. Id. at 701-02.
Prisoners' suits seem even more outrageous, however, because the plaintiff is not
seventy-nine-year-old Stella Liebeck, but a convicted criminal.
86. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1932, 1346; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. IV 1998)).
87. 141 Cong. Rec. 10, 14570 (1995); see also 141 Cong. Rec. 19, 26553-54 (1995)
(reporting Senator Kyl's concern about the effect of prisoner litigation on the federal
docket). In addition to deterring frivolous prisoners' lawsuits, the PLRA was
designed to make it more difficult for federal judges to become involved in the
administration of state prisons by issuing consent decrees. hi. at 26552. For an
analysis of the provisions of the PLRA that deal with judicial activism, see Solano,
supra note 23, at 286-90 (focusing on the PLRA's limitations on judicial intervention
in prison litigation and prison administration).
88. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-1997j (1994)).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1997c (amended 1996).
90. Id.§ 1997e(a)(1).
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malicious, or failing to state a cause of action;9 (2) the revocation of a
prisoner's earned release credit for filing a frivolous claim;9 (3) the
allowance of sua sponte dismissals of any claim that fails to state a
cause of action;93 and (4) the requirement that prisoners exhaust
"available" administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal
court. 94 Therefore, while CRIPA aimed to reduce prisoners' lawsuits
in addition to enforcing prisoners' rights, the PLRA focused on
keeping prisoners out of court.
C. The PLRA 's Effect: Conflict and Confusion
The PLRA was generally praised as addressing a problem that had
spiraled out of control." Nevertheless, the provisions that seek to
curtail frivolous lawsuits, such as the exhaustion requirement, have
generated substantial criticism and confusion.96 As a general matter,
some commentators have criticized the justifications for enacting the
PLRA as inaccurate and misleading. 97 The legislators who developed
the PLRA garnered support for the bill by pointing to dramatic
examples of frivolous lawsuits. Former Senator Bob Dole, who
introduced the PLRA, explained that "[p]risoners have filed lawsuits
claiming such grievances as insufficient storage locker space, being
prohibited from attending a wedding anniversary party, and yes, being
served creamy peanut butter instead of the chunky variety they had
ordered."9 As described earlier, however, much of this rhetoric was
inaccurate. 99 Congress relied on images that illustrated the frivolous
claims without recognizing any of the legitimate ones.
One
commentator
described
the
PLRA
as
"based
on
myths
rather
than
hearings. ' '1"
Further, there is some question as to what the PLRA actually
accomplished in light of the federal courts' "modified hands-off"
approach, which already placed restrictions on prisoners' civil rights
claims."' That is, if the courts had already been acting to restrain
lawsuits by denying more claims, why would Congress need to go
91.
92.
93.
94.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1998).
Id. § 1932.
Id. § 1915A(b).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998); infra Part II.

95. See, e.g., Andrew Peyton Thomas, Congress Revokes Prisoners' Access to

Frivolous Appeals, Wall St. J., July 3, 1996, at All (describing the PLRA's
requirements as "common-sense restrictions on inmate litigation").
96. See supra note 22 (listing cases in which various provisions of the PLRA have
been challenged on constitutional grounds).
97. Harding, supra note 36, at 20; Herman, supra note 11, at 1231.
98. 141 Cong. Rec. 10, 14570 (1995).
99. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text; see also Tushnet & Yackle,
supra note 72, at 19 n.119 (describing the peanut butter case as an "urban legend").
100. Herman, supra note 11, at 1231.
101. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (explaining the current
"modified hands-off" approach).
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further and enact the PLRA? According to some commentators, the
only reason was to score political points with constituents."' 2 Not
unlike statutes prohibiting flag-burning enacted after the Supreme
Court declared them unconstitutional, "symbolic statutes""" such as
the PLRA create valuable political points for legislators, while often
posing problems of interpretation and administration for courts,
government employees, and others affected by the statute.
Criticism that the PLRA lacks substance gains support when one
examines the manner in which Congress enacted it. The PLRA's
legislative process was markedly fast and "lack[ed]... any real
debate.""
Congress passed the PLRA as a rider to an omnibus
appropriations bill, 105 so it was "never the subject of a Committee
mark-up, and there [was] no Judiciary Committee report."''- There
was just one hearing in the Judiciary Committee." 7 Senator Ted
Kennedy noted that this abbreviated process was "hardly the type of
thorough review that a measure of this scope deserves."
Probably
due to this abbreviated process, the PLRA emerged with areas of
ambiguity 1 9 and subsequently created judicial conflict."" As critics
have pointed out, "even the title could have used editing.""' While
titled the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it was passed in 1996.
This truncated, slipshod legislative process underscores the degree to
which the PLRA represents Congress' questionable foray into an area
already managed by federal courts. The next part examines one
provision of the PLRA that has caused conflict in its application: the
requirement that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies.

II. THE PLRA'S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT: How FAR
DOES IT Go?

The PLRA's requirement that prisoners exhaust their
administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court" 2
supports Congress' general goal of reducing frivolous prisoner
litigation. This provision amended § 1997e(a), the exhaustion
102. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 72, at 2-3.
103. Id at 3.

104. Herman, supra note 11, at 1277 (describing the PLRA as taking a -scattershot
approach"); see Pepe, supra note 23, at 62.
105. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
106. 142 Cong. Rec. 4, 5193 (1996).
107. Id.
108. Id Senator Kennedy's primary concern with the PLRA was its breadth as an
"effort to strip Federal courts of the authority to remedy unconstitutional prison
conditions." Id.
109. See Hall v. McCoy, 89 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (W.D. Va. 2000) (concluding that
§ 1997e(a) of the PLRA is "facially ambiguous").
110. Infra Part II.C.
111. Herman, supra note 11, at 1277.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
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provision that was originally included by Congress in CRIPA."3
However, while the CRIPA exhaustion provision allowed for judicial
discretion based on considerations of the fairness of the administrative
procedure, the PLRA removed such considerations and now forces
plaintiffs to exhaust all "remedies as are available.""' 4
The reaction to Congress' requirement that all prisoners exhaust
their administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal
court has generally been positive. Commentators and courts view the
exhaustion requirement as a step toward preventing frivolous lawsuits
from reaching federal court.' 5 Nevertheless, because of the PLRA's
amendments to § 1997e(a), application of this provision has caused
considerable confusion.
This part frames the current conflict regarding interpretation of the
exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a). First, this part provides
background on the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, explaining
its justifications, benefits, and exceptions. It then illustrates the
conflict regarding the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a) by
discussing the different approaches taken by the federal circuits.
A. The Doctrineof Exhaustion
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, along with
the doctrines of abstention, finality, and ripeness, governs the timing
of federal court review 1 6 so as to avoid "judicial and administrative
conflict and confusion.""' 7 An exhaustion requirement is based on the
theory that a matter is not ready for judicial review because "there
remain administrative procedures that might resolve it, or further
develop the facts."' l Accordingly, when exhaustion is required,
parties may not appeal to a court "until they have availed themselves
of all possible remedies within the [administrative] agency.""9
Plaintiffs therefore file complaints first with the agency's dispute
resolution system instead of regular judicial channels.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies can be beneficial to
administrative bodies, the courts, and the plaintiffs. First, exhaustion
requirements benefit the administrative body in question by
113. Id. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994).
114. Id. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
115. Kuzinski, supra note 23, at 361, 380-81 (arguing generally that the PLRA will
produce necessary and effective reform and that mandatory exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a way to solve disputes more immediately and less
expensively).
116. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
117. 5 Stein et al., Administrative Law § 49.01, at 49-22 (2000).
118. Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States 232 (1989).
119. 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.01, at 49-3; see also Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (describing the operation of an
exhaustion requirement).
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preserving its resources and preventing outside interference into its
authority over prison administration."0 By preventing litigation in the
judicial system, an effective grievance procedure allows an
administrative body to avoid the heavy costs of defending civil rights
suits in federal court.121 Additionally, requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to exercise the
authority granted to them by the legislature2
The exhaustion
doctrine can therefore be seen as "'an expression of executive and
administrative autonomy,"'1I which is required because many of the
actions under review involve the administrative body's discretionary
power or special expertise.
Second, exhaustion requirements are attractive to courts because
they can lighten caseloads by preventing the need for judicial
review. 24 Even where federal court review cannot be avoided after
exhaustion of administrative remedies, exhausting remedies "may
produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration."'2
Such a record would focus the issues involved in the dispute and
streamline the case so as to use fewer judicial resources once the
matter landed in federal court. This case development or streamlining
is especially important in cases that involve highly specific and
complex technical or factual backgrounds. 26 Exhaustion allows the
more expert administrative agency to explain its decision-making
process and thus create a helpful record for the reviewing judge.'Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be beneficial to
plaintiffs by making judicial involvement unnecessary."" Litigation in
courts can take years, while administrative procedures are generally
designed to proceed more quickly. 29 Federal courts only address
120. See 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.01, at 49-8; McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145: Penner
v. Madigan, 974 F.2d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1992): Sonya Gidumal, Note, McCarthy v.
Madigan: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Bivens, 7 Admin. I._.
Am. U.
373, 380 (1993).
121. See Lynn S. Branham, Limiting the Burdens of Pro Se Inmate Litigation: A

Technical-Assistance Manual for Courts, Correctional Officials, and Attorneys
General 33 (1997).

122. 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.01, at 49-15 (noting that "[a]n agency's enabling
legislation often vests it with an exclusive initial responsibility for interpreting and
applying the statutes it enforces"); see also Gidumal, supra note 120, at 381.
123. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969) (quoting L. Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action 425 (1965)).
124. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145; see also Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of
Grievance Proceduresfor State Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act,
71 Iowa L. Rev. 935, 935 (1986) (noting that the number of civil rights suits in federal
courts brought by prisoners has "swelled" because of a lack of effective opportunities
to exhaust administrative remedies).
125. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145; see also 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.01, at 49-15 to
49-17.
126. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145.
127. Id.
128. 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.01, at 49-17 to 49-19.
129. J.Michael Keating, Jr. et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Grievance Mechanisms in
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problems of constitutional dimensions, while grievance procedures are
not so limited. 13 A system without the jurisdictional and procedural
constraints of federal court can thus provide an "effective, credible
machinery to 1provide
an outlet for [prisoners'] complaints and
31

dissatisfaction.'
While administrative exhaustion can confer benefits on all parties,
there are situations in which courts will not require it.3 2 Where a
litigant faces an inadequate or futile administrative procedure, for
example, courts provide an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. 33 Plaintiffs are not required to enter a grievance system
that has no way of satisfying their complaint."
As one court
explained: "When there is nothing to be gained from the exhaustion
of administrative remedies ... courts have not been reluctant to
discard this doctrine."'3 5 In addition, even where the agency provides
an adequate administrative process, the remedy available to the
litigant through that process must be an effective one. 3 6 Where the
administrative process provides only remedies that are inadequate in
kind or proportion to the particular claim, exhaustion is
unnecessary. 37 Courts have found inadequacy where agency review
Correctional Institutions 3-4 (1975).
130. See id. at 3.
131. Id. at 6.
132. While courts may exercise discretion in applying exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine, the Supreme Court has limited that ability when Congress is specific in its
requirements. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765-66 (1975) (finding that
because the requirement in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) (1970), that
parties obtain a "final" administrative decision was statutorily mandated, it "may not
be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion").
133. See 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.02[4], at 49-63 to 49-67. In RandolphSheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the
District of Columbia Circuit characterized these two exceptions as follows:
Resort to the administrative process is futile if the agency will almost
certainly deny any relief either because it has a preconceived position on, or
lacks jurisdiction over, the matter. The administrative process is inadequate
where the agency has expressed a willingness to act, but the relief it will
provide through its action will not be sufficient to right the wrong ....
Under the futility exception a court must look to the agency's intentions
regarding its position on the relevant issue and its statutory authority. When
determining whether a remedy will be adequate, a court must consider all
potential methods at the agency's disposal to remedy a violation if one is
found.
Id.
134. See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)
(noting an exception to exhaustion where it "prove[s] futile"); Doe by Gonzales v.
Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to apply an exhaustion
requirement where the agency failed to notify the plaintiff of the available avenues of
relief); Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 2d 236, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (stating that "excessive or pervasive untimeliness in rendering administrative
decisions may provide grounds for finding futility").
135. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1967).
136. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1992).
137. See 5 Stein, supra note 117, § 49.02[1], at 49-47 to 49-48.
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has caused unreasonable delay,' where the agency lacks fact-finding
procedures,139 where an agency is biased,"' and where the agency
lacks the power to grant the requested relief.'
Therefore, the
benefits of the exhaustion doctrine are outweighed where its
application places an undue burden on the plaintiff.
B. The Exhaustion Requirement of the PLRA

The vast majority of civil lawsuits filed by prisoners in federal court
are civil fights actions by state inmates. 4 2 These suits are filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows suits by individuals against
those acting under the color of state law.'43 Similarly, federal inmates
alleging constitutional violations may sue in federal court under the
judicially-created Bivens doctrine, which provides a remedy for
constitutional violations by federal agents."

In general, courts do not require plaintiffs filing suit under § 1983 or
Bivens to exhaust administrative remedies before entering court.4 5 In
138. See, e.g., Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1493-94 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
the claim of the U.S. Air Force that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies because the case "languishe[d] in the administrative phase").
139. See, e.g., Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 598 (2d Cir. 1974) (reversing the district
court's exhaustion requirement because "nowhere in the administrative process...
was there a procedure designed to resolve factual issues").
140. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148: Anderson v. Babbitt, 230 F.3d 1158. 1164 (9th Cir.

2000).

141. See, e.g., Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying an
exception to the exhaustion requirement because the agency had no authority to
grant the relief requested); Jorden v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 102 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1986) (declining to apply an exhaustion requirement because the agency could
not reinstate a former national guard as was requested in the claim).
142. PrisonerPetitions,supra note 8, at 2 tbl.1.
143. Section 1983 does not confer substantive rights but provides for the
enforcement of rights created by the Constitution or federal statute. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom.
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1998).
144. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Additionally, federal inmates may elect to sue under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which requires administrative exhaustion through
the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (Supp. IV 1998). For a
discussion of the FTCA and prisoner tort litigation, see Lori Carver Praed, Note,
Reducing the Federal Docket. An Exclusive Adninistrative Remedy for Prisoners
Bringing Tort Claims Under the Federal Tort Clains Act, 24 Ind. L.Rev. 439, 442-44
(1991).
145. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n. 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990) ("The availability
of state administrative procedures ordinarily does not foreclose resort to § 1983.");
Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215. 219 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts
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Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida,46 the Supreme Court concluded
that the framers of the precursor to § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of
1871, "did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to
exhaust state administrative remedies." '47 The Patsy Court recognized
an exception to this general rule, however, where Congress explicitly
provides that particular § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust administrative
procedures. 4 8

In 1980, Congress passed CRIPA and created such a particularized
exhaustion requirement for prisoners. 14 9 This exhaustion requirement
allowed courts to force plaintiffs into administrative procedures where
such an action would be "appropriate" and "in the interest of
justice."'5 ° Additionally, because of the limitations on the doctrine of
exhaustion, such as futility and inadequacy, 5 ' this pre-PLRA
requirement of § 1997e(a) stipulated that exhaustion was necessary
where the administrative remedies available were "plain, speedy, and
effective."' 52 In order to meet this standard, state prisons could be
certified by the Department of Justice (the "DOJ").1'"

Such

certification would demonstrate that the state had substantially
complied with the DOJ's "minimal acceptable standards" for prison
grievance systems. 154 Thus, prior to the PLRA, "§ 1997e imposed a
limited and discretionary exhaustion requirement.""' The statute
imposed procedural safeguards which assured that the grievance
56
procedures that prisoners would be required to exhaust were fair.

universally agree that the exhaustion of state administrative remedies is generally not
required prior to bringing an action under § 1983 in federal court."); Van Harken v.
City of Chi., 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that exhaustion is not
necessary for filing a § 1983 claim).
146. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
147. Id. at 507.
148. Id. at 508.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994) (amended 1996). Prior to its amendment,
CRIPA § 1997e(a)(1) provided:
[flIn any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult
convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would
be appropriate and in the interest of justice, continue such case for a period
of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain,
speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.
Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1).
153. See id. § 1997e(a)(2). Under this section, the exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required "unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has
determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the
minimal acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are
otherwise fair and effective." Id.
154. Id.
155. Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882,885 (5th Cir. 1998).
156. See Note, Resolving Prisoners'Grievances out of Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 1309, 1311 (1991) [hereinafter Resolving Prisoners'Grievances] (noting
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Under the

PLRA, all plaintiffs with claims involving prison conditions must
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal

court. 157 The PLRA deleted the phrase "plain, speedy, and effective,"

and now requires exhaustion of "such administrative remedies as are
'
available."158
In doing so, Congress seemingly did away with any
consideration of whether the prison grievance procedure was fair.
That is, "Congress no longer wanted courts to examine the
effectiveness of administrative remedies but rather to focus solely on
whether an administrative remedy program is 'available' in the prison

involved."15' 9

Nevertheless, while § 1997e(a) restricts prisoners from filing
lawsuits under federal law until "available" administrative remedies
are exhausted,"6 the section is not clear on exactly what needs to be
available. Must the inmate's specific remedy requested be available,
or must any remedy be available? In particular, because most prison
grievance systems do not provide money damages as an available
remedy, 161 courts have struggled to apply the provision where the

plaintiff seeks monetary damages as opposed to injunctive relief."
Where the prisoner brings a claim requesting both monetary and
injunctive relief, no court of appeals has recognized a futility
exception.163 Courts have differed, however, on whether to allow an
exception when the petitioner seeks money damages exclusively.11
C. The Judicial Conflict
Because Congress failed to define what was meant by the term
"available," courts have interpreted the provision differently.,', A
that the procedural safeguards of the pre-PLRA § 1997e(a) suggest "that the drafters
were balancing the needs of the federal courts and the interests of state officials
against the rights of prisoners to have access to the courts through section 1983").
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998). Section 1997e(a). as amended, reads:
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted." Id
158. Id159. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998). The PLRA specifies
the type of claims that the statute affects: those involving "prison conditions." 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
161. See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Regs. 44-15-101a (1997 & Supp. 1999) (listing remedies
but not including money damages); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 701.1701.16 (2000) (making no mention of any available monetary remedy): Ohio Admin.
Code § 5120-9-31 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (same).
162. An injunction is defined as "[a] court order commanding or preventing an
action." Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999).
163. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2000).
164. See infra Part II.C.
165. Fiedler, supra note 23, at 725-33 (discussing a "three-way split of authority" in
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split among the courts has emerged in cases where an inmate seeks
monetary relief that the prison grievance system is unable to
provide. 166 Some courts have read the provision to apply only where
the plaintiffs requested remedy is available, while others have held
that the prison
must merely make available a generalized grievance
167
procedure.

For example, at the district court level, the Southern District of

New York and the Western District of Virginia have held that
exhaustion is required under § 1997e(a) even where the plaintiff seeks
monetary damages and such damages are not available through the
administrative process. 16 In contrast, the District of New Jersey and

the Central District of California held that the PLRA did not require
exhaustion in such cases. 69

The circuits that have addressed this issue have split as well. The
Third Circuit recently overruled the District of New Jersey and found
the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) applicable to all
situations.17° This decision brought the Third Circuit in line with the
Sixth,'17 1 Seventh

2

and Eleventh 173 Circuits.

Nevertheless, the

cases decided through 1998).
166. Id. Since 1998, numerous courts other than those cited by Fiedler have
addressed the issue, including the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See
infra note 167.
167. Compare Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000) (requiring
exhaustion); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999) (same) (cert.
petition filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3756 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1918)); Perez v. Wis.
Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding exhaustion necessary but
noting that it is "possible to imagine cases" in which an exception would apply);
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (requiring exhaustion);
Majid v. Wilhelm, 110 F. Supp. 2d 251, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that the
PLRA mandates exhaustion even where the relief sought is unavailable); Hall v.
McCoy, 89 F. Supp. 2d 742, 747-48 (W.D. Va. 2000) (same); Edney v. Karrigan, 69 F.
Supp. 2d 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Vazquez v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 8427, 1999
WL 440631, at *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1999) (same); Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility,
28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same), with Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d
1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that exhaustion is not required where a grievance
program is available but the program does not provide the type of remedy sought);
Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 885-87 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Garrett v. Hawk, 127
F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Raines v. Pickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 552,
554 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); Royster v. United States, No. 98 Civ. 4109, 1999 WL
1567734, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1999) (same); Woods v. Fitzpatrick, No. 96 Civ.
1120, 1999 WL 221108, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999) (same); Plasencia v. California,
29 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150-52 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (same).
168. See Hall, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 747; Edney, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 544; Beeson, 28 F.
Supp. 2d at 895-96.
169. See Plasencia,29 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316
(D.N.J. 1998), overruled by Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71. For a discussion of Nyhuis, see
infra text accompanying notes 187-204.
170. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71.
171. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999).
172. Perez, 182 F.3d at 537.
173. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1328 (1lth Cir. 1998).
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Fifth,174 Ninth, 175 and Tenth'76 Circuits have interpreted the PLRA to

contain an exception to the exhaustion requirement when money
damages are unavailable under the administrative process.
1. The Third Circuit: White v. Fauver and Nyluis v. Reno
In White v. Fauver, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit alleging that
prison officials and guards violated their constitutional rights by
subjecting them to physical abuse, threats, and unconstitutional living

conditions such as serving rancid food and depriving inmates of
showers, bedding, and clothing.'" The plaintiffs sought damages as
well as injunctive relief. 7
The New Jersey Inmate Grievance
Procedure, however, does not offer monetary remedies.

9

In

response to the state's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the District of New Jersey held that
requiring the prisoner to exhaust an administrative procedure which
cannot provide the
remedy requested would be nothing more than a
180
"hollow gesture."'
The court arrived at this decision by examining how Congress used
the word "available" in the statute. The term "available" was not
defined in the PLRA, so the court applied the term's ordinary
meaning.' Because "available" modified "remedy," Judge Orlofsky,
writing for the court, found that "available" meant that the remedy
sought could be obtained2 2 According to the court, interpreting
"available remedy" to mean that "some procedure is available, the use
of which would be but an empty formality" would be "contrary to a
commonsense interpretation of the statutory language.- ' ?'
Further, the court noted that applying the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement in this case would amount to a conclusion that Congress
included the provision in order to create purposeless barriers for
prisonersY 4 Such a conclusion contradicts the Supreme Court's
instruction. In Stone v. INS,ss the Supreme Court explained that
"[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its
174. Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882,886-87 (5th Cir. 1998).
175. Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999).
176. Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1997).
177. White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305,308-09 (D.N.J. 1998).
178. Id. at 308.
179. Id at 317.
180. Id. at 316.
181. Id. at 317 ("When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their
ordinary meaning." (quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187
(1995))).
182. Id. (finding that the "'available administrative remedy' means that the
particular relief sought can be obtained through the administrative process").
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 514 U.S. 386 (1995).
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amendment to have real and substantial effect."' 1 6 Thus, in White, the
court reasoned that when Congress included the qualification
"available" for those remedies that must be exhausted, it was meant
to have a real effect. If the term was inconsequential, it would not
have been added at all.
In Nyhuis v. Reno,"8 the Third Circuit overturned White.'," In
Nyhuis, a federal inmate brought suit alleging that prison officials
illegally confiscated several items of his personal property. 18 9 The
plaintiff here sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as
injunctive relief.190 The court recognized that because the claim
contained a mixture of injunctive remedies and monetary damages,
the petition must be dismissed under § 1997e(a). 9' Even courts that
have allowed an exception for unavailable money damages have
refused to extend the exception to mixed claim cases such as this
one. 19 The Nyhuis court went further, however, and held that neither
a futility nor an inadequacy exception is applicable "in any case. '"'93
The Third Circuit cited four principal reasons for denying an
exception to § 1997e(a) where money damages are not available in the
grievance system. First, contrary to the White court, the Third Circuit
focused on the fact that the PLRA removed the phrase "plain, speedy
and effective," rather than added the qualifier "available."' 94 That is,
by removing the requirement that grievance systems be "plain, speedy
and effective," Congress eliminated all considerations of whether
exhausting the procedure would accomplish anything.'95 In other
words, "'Congress now conditions prisoner suits on exhaustion of...
administrative remedies, without regard to whether those remedies
are "effective," without regard to whether they substantially comply
with "minimum acceptable standards,"
and without regard to whether
' ' 196
they are "just and effective.'
Second, the court reasoned that providing an exception for suits
that seek money damages would run contrary to congressional intent.
As stated above, the PLRA was designed to curtail frivolous

186. Id. at 397.
187. 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 71; accord Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293-98 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 377 (2000).
189. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 70 (explaining that even those courts that have declined to apply § 1997c
to cases where prisoners seek only unavailable money damages have not extended the
exception to mixed-claim cases).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).
194. Id. at 72.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted)).
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litigation. 197 Any exemption that might hinder the restrictions placed
on prisoners by Congress would be inconsistent with the legislative
intent. Allowing prisoners to go directly to federal court simply by
requesting money damages would certainly act against the restrictive
policies of the PLRA.' 9

The court's third reason for denying an exemption was that
requiring courts to examine "the vagaries of prison administrative
processes" conflicted with Congress' intent to lighten the load of
prisoners' cases on the federal docket.'" That is, courts would need to
examine each particular grievance procedure to determine whether
the relief requested was available. Because the PLRA deleted the
discretion of the CRIPA exhaustion requirement, -' the court noted
that judicial examination of administrative procedures was
"something Congress was plainly guarding against when it enacted the
PLRA. "201
Fourth, the court reasoned that imposing a mandatory exhaustion
requirement in all cases accomplished the general goals of the
doctrine of exhaustion.0 2 In particular, exhaustion furthered the goal
of judicial efficiency. 203 Even where the prisoner exhausts the "futile"
grievance procedure and continues on into federal court, the
"administrative process can serve to create a record for subsequent
proceedings, it can be used to help focus and clarify poorly pled or
confusing claims, and it forces the prison to justify or explain its
internal procedures. ' '21 The court can therefore benefit from
exhaustion even where the grievance procedure does not satisfy the
prisoner's claim.
2. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits: Garrettv. Hawk and Whitley' v. Hunt
In Garrett v. Hawk, °5 the Tenth Circuit reached a conclusion in
opposition to the Third Circuit's decision that the exhaustion
requirement should apply across the board. In Garrett,the plaintiff, a
federal inmate, sustained head injuries during a fistfight with another
inmate.2 6 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the prison officials
"exhibited deliberate indifference" to his medical needs, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.'- 7 The plaintiff exclusively sought
197. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
198. See Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 74.
199. Id
200. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
201. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 74.
202 Id. at 75. For a discussion of the rationales behind the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative procedures, see supra text accompanying notes 116-31.
203. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 76.
204. Id.
205. 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997).
206. Id. at 1264.
207. Id.
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monetary damages. Under the grievance procedure of the United
States Bureau of Prisons, however, any claim seeking such damages
would be rejected as "constituting improper subject matter for
administrative review."208
Before addressing the applicability of the exhaustion requirement
to the particular grievance system in the case, the court explained the
effect of § 1997e(a) on administrative exhaustion in prisoners' civil
rights cases. The court stressed that unlike the pre-PLRA § 1997e(a),
which provided for discretionary exhaustion, the current provision
made exhaustion mandatory. 2 9 Thus, like the Third Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit saw no more room for judges to decide whether
exhaustion would be worthwhile.210
The Garrett court acknowledged Congress' requirement that
remedies be available for the prisoner to exhaust under the PLRA.
The government conceded that no money damages were available
under the Bureau of Prisons grievance procedure, but argued that the
plaintiff had administrative remedies available to him under the
Federal Tort Claims Act211 ("FTCA"), which provides for money
damages.212 Therefore, the government argued, all "available
remedies" had not been exhausted.2 3
Since prisoners have
constitutional rights to sue individual prison officials independently of
the FTCA, however, the court refused to apply the FTCA
administrative remedies to the plaintiff's civil rights claim.214 The
Bureau of Prisons did not make money damages available to plaintiffs
through its grievance procedures, 215 and thus, 2 1the
exhaustion
6
requirement was not applicable to the plaintiff's case.
Similarly, in Whitley v. Hunt,217 the Fifth Circuit decided that
Congress' specification of "available" remedies made it unnecessary
for prisoners to pursue fruitless administrative procedures.18 The
Fifth Circuit
relied heavily on the common definition of the word
"available. ' 21 9 According to the court, "a remedy is 'available' when it
can be availed 'for the accomplishment of a purpose' or 'is
accessible
or may be obtained.' ' '22 This remedy was unavailable because
208. Id. at 1266.
209. Id. at 1265.

210. See id. ("[T]he revised version [of] § 1997e reveals that Congress specifically
amended the statute to... requir[e] federal prisoners to exhaust all administrative
remedies before bringing a [civil rights claim].").
211. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1994).
212. Id. § 2674.
213. Garrett, 127 F.3d at 1266.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1267.
216. See id.

217.
218.
219.
220.

158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 886.
Id. at 887.
Id. (quoting Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
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exhaustion would not accomplish the inmate's stated purpose of
obtaining money damages.
The Whitley court also highlighted a point made by the Tenth
Circuit in Garrettby noting that the legislature should be required to
specify its intentions. The court explained that "there is nothing to
prevent Congress, and perhaps even the Bureau of Prisons, from
enacting regulations that would permit the recovery of monetary relief
from individual prison officials."' ' 1 Otherwise, the court cannot infer
from plain language that requires exhaustion only of available
that Congress intended the exhaustion of
administrative remedies,
"
unavailable remedies.!
It should be noted that in Wright v. Hollingsworth,- a recent panel
of the Fifth Circuit pleaded for en banc reconsideration of Whitley due
to the issue's "exceptional importance."" 4 In Wright, the court's
conclusion was bound by the circuit precedent set by Whitlev. The
court took note of the conflict in the circuits, however, and lobbied
the Fifth Circuit to consider adopting the interpretation of the circuits
As of the date of this writing, no such
taking the opposite view.'
reconsideration has occurred.
3. The Seventh Circuit: A Mixed Approach
While the Third and Eleventh Circuits adopted a categorical denial
of the futility argument against application of § 1997e(a), and the
Tenth and Fifth Circuits have permitted it, the Seventh Circuit has
taken an intermediary position. In Perez v. Wisconsin Department of
Corrections.'z a prisoner injured his back in the shower, and the
Department of Corrections did not approve the surgery
recommended by a physician.' 2 Rather, the agency prescribed a more
natural form of recovery: "exercise, physical therapy, and basic pain
This treatment strategy did not alleviate the
control medicine. '"
inmate's pain, and he subsequently sought damages for deprivation of
medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.'

Webster's New International Dictionary 150 (3d ed. 1981))).
221. Id. (footnote omitted); Garrett, 127 F.3d at 1267; see also McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 156 (1992) ("Congress, of course, is free to design or require
an appropriate administrative procedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim for money
damages.").
222. See Whitley, 158 F.3d at 886.
223. 201 F.3d 663, 666-67 (5th Cir. 2000).
224. Id at 666.
225. Id. (urging the panel to consider taking the "Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits' interpretation of § 1997e(a)" (footnote omitted)).
226. 182 F-3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 533-34.
228. Id at 534.
229. Id
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The Seventh Circuit found no general futility exception to
§ 1997e(a)."3 The court framed the question as whether any remedies
are available, not the particular one that the prisoner requested. 3 '
Thus, the exhaustion requirement should apply to all cases because
"§ 1997e(a) does not require the prison to use the prisoner's preferred
remedy." 23 The court also relied on the familiar "floodgate"
reasoning used by other courts denying the futility exception. 3 That
is, recognizing such an exception would permit prisoners to "evade
[the PLRA] simply by asking for relief that the administrative process
is unable to provide."'
The Perez court further justified its denial of an exception by
pointing to its treatment of similar arguments under different
statutory exhaustion requirements .1 5 In Charlie F. v. Board of
Education of Skokie School District 68,16 the Seventh Circuit rejected
an argument for an exception to the exhaustion requirement under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA").23 7 The
court reasoned in CharlieF. that even though the school board did not
provide monetary 38 awards, it made available "services in kind" or
"money's worth." The school board could therefore offer a form of
damages by measuring the cost of the services that a successful
claimant could receive. 9 Thus, applying the reasoning of Charlie F.,
the Perez court concluded that: "[I]t was impossible to draw a bright
'
line between damages and other relief."24
Unlike the Third and Eleventh Circuits, however, the Perez court
recognized a situation where a futility exception might apply even
though the PLRA required exhaustion in Perez's case. 4' According
to the court, there may be cases where no further administrative
remedy would satisfy the claimant.242 In these cases, the court
suggested that exhaustion would be unnecessary.243 Such a situation
might arise, the court pointed out, where a broken leg is mistreated
230- See id. at 537.
231 Id.
232. Id. (emphasis omitted); accord Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733-35 (7th
Cir. 1999).
233. See, e.g., Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (noting that "exempting such claims would enable prisoners to evade the
exhaustion requirement easily").
234. Perez, 182 F.3d at 537.
235. Id. at 538.
236. 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996).
237. Id. at 991-92; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring administrative
exhaustion of suits brought under the IDEA).
238. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992.
239. Id.
240. Perez, 182 F.3d at 538.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also Fiedler, supra note 23, at 731-33 (discussing cases that distinguish
claims alleging past wrongs).
243. Perez, 182 F.3d at 538.
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but heals by the time the suit begins.2' Nothing other than damages
could provide a remedy for the plaintiff. 45 Thus, exhaustion of an
administrative procedure that cannot provide damages would be
pointless.246 Since the Perez decision, at least one district court has
used the court's hypothetical to exempt a prisoner's suit from the
'
exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a).247
Therefore, although the
Seventh Circuit has taken the position that a futility exception does
not exist,248 Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Perez suggests that one
may be applied under just the right circumstances.
The mixed approach of the Seventh Circuit in Perez highlights
arguments on both sides of the dispute. On the one hand, providing
an exception to plaintiffs simply because they seek money damages
may provide a loophole that undermines the attempt to alleviate
pressure on the federal docket. However, requiring exhaustion of
grievance procedures that cannot satisfy the only relief sought may
deny plaintiffs any adequate remedy. Prisoners should not be forced
to exhaust administrative procedures that are incomplete or
inadequate. In Part III below, this Note proposes allowing a limited
exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to avoid such an
inequitable result. This exception would apply only to lawsuits
exclusively seeking unavailable money damages.
III. AN EXCEPTION TO § 1997e(a) IS NEEDED FOR SUITS SEEKING
UNAVAILABLE MONEY DAMAGES

Analysis of the most recent PLRA cases shows that courts are
increasingly applying the exhaustion requirement to all cases, even
when money damages are sought but are unavailable. -4 The Fifth
Circuit, which originally adopted an exception to the exhaustion
requirement, has questioned itself and looked longingly towards the
circuits that decided the issue differently. -' The Fifth Circuit's envy is
understandable, considering the heavy pressure on the federal docket.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rodriguez v. Oakley, No. 98 C 4152, 1999 WL 618840, at *2 (N.D. I1I. Aug. 9,

1999).
248. Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727,733 (7th Cir. 1999).
249. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 78 (3d Cir. 2000); Hall v. McCoy, 89 F. Supp. 2d
742, 747-48 (W.D. Va. 2000). Contra Odumosu v. Keller, No. 99-0215, 200) WL
241644, slip op. at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 1,2000) (holding in an unpublished opinion,
without full analysis of the issue, that the prisoner seeking exclusively monetary
damages was not required to exhaust administrative procedures because
"administrative action could afford [the petitioner] neither meaningful review nor
appropriate remedy and the benefits of exhaustion do not obtain in this case").
250. See Wright v. Hollingsworth, 201 F.3d 663, 665-66 (5th Cir. 2000) (following
the circuit precedent set by Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998), but urging
the circuit to reconsider taking the position adopted by circuits that require

exhaustion).
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As the Wright court explained, requiring exhaustion "will significantly
affect the docket.., in which thousands of prisoner suits are filed."'I
Nevertheless, while courts may be legitimately concerned with the
burden on their dockets caused by prisoners (and other tort plaintiffs),
this concern does not justify applying the exhaustion requirement of
§ 1997e(a) to suits in which the only remedy sought is unavailable
money damages. The exhaustion requirement will only significantly
lighten the load on federal dockets if the administrative process is
effective in settling disputes. In mixed cases, where the petitioner
seeks both injunctive relief and money damages, exhaustion still
serves its purpose by providing a useful record and settling at least the
injunctive relief claim. Where only unavailable money damages are
sought, however, exhaustion forces plaintiffs to comply with
procedures that cannot provide the relief necessary to settle their
claim.
As a result, parties cannot enjoy the full benefits of
exhaustion.~
This part therefore argues that the Supreme Court should settle the
conflict among federal courts by finding the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement inapplicable to cases where prisoners seek only money
damages and where such damages are unavailable through the
administrative process. This conclusion follows from the words of the
statute, congressional intent, and policy considerations.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute Favors Applying an Exception
The exhaustion requirement of prisoners' civil rights claims is
statutorily imposed by § 1997e(a), so analysis should begin with
consideration of the statute itself. While approaches to statutory
construction continue to develop,. s3 the Supreme Court has instructed
courts to begin any statutory examination with what the statute
actually says. 4 Indeed, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the first canon
251. Id. at 666.
252. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
253. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1 (1994) (noting
that "theories of statutory interpretation have blossomed like dandelions in spring").
Different approaches include: (1) intentionalism, which rests on the reconstruction of
the legislature's original intent; (2) purposivism, which resolves statutory ambiguities
by applying the general purpose or objective of the statute; and (3) textualism, which
looks to the apparent meaning of the statutory language. Id. at 14-47. The question of
the propriety of the different statutory approaches is not within the scope of this
Note. Rather, this Note applies the textualism-dominated approach currently favored
by the Supreme Court. See infra Part III.A.
254. Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2000) ("In analyzing a statute,
we begin by examining the text...."); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In
the absence of... a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its
ordinary or natural meaning."); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.
469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the
language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial
inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is
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of statutory construction is simple: "Read the statute."' 1 In this case,
such examination points directly to the conclusion that exhaustion is
not required under § 1997e(a) where the sole requested remedy is
unavailable.
Looking at the plain meaning of the statute requires looking at the
plain meaning of the words used therein. "' Section 1997e(a) states
that no prisoners' suits may be brought into federal court "until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."'
Clearly,
the word "available" refers to the term "administrative remedies."
Because the term "available" is not defined in the statute, its ordinary
meaning applies. 8 Available is defined as something that is "readily
obtainable."' 9 As the White court correctly recognized, it follows
from a logical reading of the language of § 1997e(a) that where money
damages are inaccessible or unobtainable, the requirement does not
apply.2'
Courts that apply § 1997e(a) to cases seeking unavailable money
damages look not to what the language of the statute says, but to what
it does not say. 2" When Congress enacted the PLRA, it amended
§ 1997e(a) by deleting language. The pre-PLRA § 1997e(a) required
"exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative
remedies as are available." 2
This language was shortened by the
PLRA to read, simply, "such administrative remedies as are
'
available."263
Thus, the language of § 1997e(a) now makes no
reference to the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the grievance
procedure.2'
As a result, some courts have held, it makes no
finished."); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981) ("[T]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring))).
255. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1373, 1374 (1992). Justice Stevens explained the basic canons of statutory
construction to be: (1) plain language; (2) effect of entire statute- (3) contemporary
context; (4) legislative history; (5) provision of a reasonable interpretation avoiding
absurd results. See id at 1374-77.
256. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (noting that
undefined statutory terms are given "their ordinary meaning").
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
25& See Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 187.
259. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 142 (2d ed. 1997).
260. See White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 317 (D.N.J. 1998), overruled by
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65,78 (3d Cir. 2000).
261. See, e.g., Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 72-73 (discussing the language deleted when
§ 1997e(a) was amended); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir.
1999) (supporting the argument by pointing to words no longer in the statute);
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (pointing to the "removal"
of "qualifiers" from the language).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994) (amended 1996).
263. Id. § 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
264. See Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326 (finding that Congress deleted the phrase,
"plain, speedy, and effective" to remove consideration of the effectiveness of
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difference whether or not prisoners can obtain their desired remedy
through the administrative process.265 In other words, concern over
whether prisoners can receive money damages improperly reinstates
the effectiveness consideration that Congress deleted.2z
Under this argument, an exception would apply only if there were
no remedies available. 267 As the Seventh Circuit in Perez explained,
where the prison system provides remedies other than money
damages, the prisoner may still receive an adequate remedy. 26 1 In
Perez, the Seventh Circuit reasoned from an analogous situation
involving exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA.26 9
This reasoning rests on the fact that the agency is able "to provide
27 in the form of some sort of injunctive relief.27 '
money's worth""
Adequate relief relates to the "events, condition, or consequences of
administrative remedies).
265. See, e.g., Perez, 182 F.3d at 537 ("[W]hen these words left the statute so did
any warrant to inquire whether exhaustion would be unavailing.").
266. See Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 72-73 ("By eliminating the 'effective' language in
Section 1997e(a), Congress saved federal courts from inquiring into whether the
particular administrative remedies available comported with inmate-plaintiff's
individualized and immediate desires for relief.").
267. Id. at 73.
268. See Perez, 182 F.3d at 537-38; see also Fiedler, supra note 23, at 744-45
(arguing that even if a prisoner sues for money damages, injunctive relief may be an
available remedy).
269. See Perez, 182 F.3d at 538 (citing Charlie F. v. Skokie Bd. of Ed. Sch. Dist. 68,
98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996)); supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. However, the
question of exhaustion of "unavailable" remedies is also in great flux in the context of
the IDEA. The IDEA requires that plaintiffs exhaust their claims when "seeking
relief that is also available under this subchapter." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (Supp. IV
1998). Money damages are not available under the IDEA. Thus, like the PLRA.
plaintiffs suing under the IDEA for monetary relief cannot obtain their requested
remedy through the administrative process. There is a split among the federal courts
about whether to apply the statutory exhaustion requirement in all cases. Compare
Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
exhaustion is not required where money damages are sought), and W.B. v. Matula, 67
F.3d 484, 496 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), with Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992-93 (holding the
opposite).
In other non-IDEA cases, where an exhaustion requirement is not statutory but has
been judicially imposed, the lack of availability of the particular relief sought weighs
against the application of the exhaustion doctrine. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (holding that a pre-PLRA inmate plaintiff did not need to
exhaust his claim for money damages because the agency "lack[ed] authority to grant
the type of relief requested"); McNeese v. Bd. of Ed. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187,
373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963) (finding no need to exhaust administrative remedies because
the agency had no power to order "corrective action"); Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
99 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding exhaustion unnecessary because the
administrative review provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not
provide money damages "and this fact counsels strongly against requiring
exhaustion").
270. Perez, 182 F.3d at 538.
271. However, Judge Easterbrook recognized a weakness in his own rationale. In
some cases, no remedy other than money damages will be sufficient, such as where a
prisoner sues for a past physical injury that no longer requires medical attention. See
id.; supra text accompanying notes 24146.
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which the person complains, not necessarily relief of the kind the

person prefers. ' '2 2 In other words, a remedy fashioned from the
available options is satisfactory no matter what the plaintiff seeks.m
Nonetheless, focusing on what Congress took out of the language
should not negate the words that, more importantly, remain. It makes
little sense to ignore the fact that the provision still specifically
qualifies the remedies that need to be exhausted as those which are

available. If the statute merely required that any remedy be available,
the language would refer more generally to available procedures."4

However, the language refers only to available remedies. The term
"remedies" illustrates that specific, requested relief is required to be
available and not simply a grievance system in which a petitioner may
file a complaint.
B. CongressionalIntent Does Not Support Applying the Exhaustion
Requirement in These Cases

Beyond the textual analysis of a statute, courts look to secondary
sources, such as legislative history, to provide helpful context for the
bare language of statutes. 27 Courts examine legislative history when
statutory language is ambiguous.

6

Courts have also looked to

legislative history when a literal interpretation of the statute results in
a conflict with the perceived statutory intent. -"
Accordingly, despite the apparent clarity of the word "available" in
§ 1997e(a), courts have consulted the legislative history of the
PLRA. 78 Congressional testimony and speeches by legislators
indicate that the PLRA was enacted at least partly in response to the
growing number of prisoners' petitions filed in federal court."9 One
of its goals was to preserve "valuable legal resources" by keeping suits
out of court.8' Thus, courts such as the Eleventh Circuit in Alexander

272. CharlieF., 98 F.3d at 992.
273. Fiedler, supra note 23, at 745 (advocating applying the exhaustion
requirement for all "ongoing wrongs" because "the statute does not condition the
exhaustion requirement on prisoners' requests for relief").
274. See Harris v. Mugarrab, No. 97-C3587, 1998 WL 246450, at 13 (N.D. Ill. May 1,
1998).
275. Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and
the Legislative Process 29 (1997). For a discussion of the problems and shortcomings
of this strategy, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Tertualism, 37 UCLA L Rev.
621, 669 (1990).
276. See Stevens, supra note 255, at 1381 (noting that courts should -consult the
legislative history" where "ambiguity persists").
277. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). This
approach, however, has received criticism as undercutting the general principle of
reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421,452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
278. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2000): Alexander v. Hawk, 159
F.3d 1321, 1326-27 & n.11 (11th Cir. 1998).
279. See 141 Cong. Rec. 10, 14570 (1995): supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
280. 141 Cong. Rec. 19,26548 (1995).
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and the Third Circuit in Nyhuis have held that providing an exception
to the exhaustion requirement would frustrate Congress' intention to
quell the tide of frivolous lawsuits brought by prisoners.28' Inmates
could evade the administrative procedures ' 2"merely by limiting their
complaints to requests for money damages. 82
While this reasoning is somewhat appealing, it does not compel
rejecting an exception when the words of the statute favor applying
one. First, as a general matter, using legislative history to perceive
Congress' collective intent is dangerous because such intent can never
be "completely 'reconstructed."'" 3 This criticism rings especially true
with a statute such as the PLRA, where there is virtually no legislative
history to examine.2 Extracting congressional intent from legislative
history that contains no committee mark-up or reports, and one
2
committee hearing with only limited debate, is highly questionable.
Leaning on legislative intent in this situation lends credence to the
theory that "one generally
finds in the legislative history only that for
' '286
which one is looking.
Even where a general intent is clear from statements in the
legislative history, legislatures usually have no collective expectations
about concrete issues in the statute. 2s7 Thus, the fact that individual
lawmakers mentioned curtailing frivolous lawsuits as a general
purpose of the PLRA does not mean that Congress meant to require
exhaustion even in cases where the requested remedy is unavailable.
Indeed, Congress' retention of the word "available" points to the
opposite conclusion.'
Moreover, allowing an exception does not necessarily run contrary
to the PLRA's stated purpose of reducing frivolous lawsuits. Courts
that rely on the legislative intent justification posit that an exception
to the exhaustion requirement will result in an onslaught of lawsuits
brought by plaintiffs taking advantage of the loophole.289 There is no
281. See, e.g., Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73-74 (noting that Congress sought to stop
inmates from filing frivolous lawsuits); Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326 n.11 ("Congress
amended section 1997e(a) largely in response to concerns about the heavy volume of
frivolous prison litigation in the federal courts.").
282. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 74.
283. Eskridge, supra note 275, at 644.
284. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
285. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1277 ("The legislative process leading to the
passage of the PLRA was characterized by haste and lack of any real debate."); supra
notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
286. Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987
Duke L.J. 371, 376.
287. See Eskridge, supra note 275, at 642.

288. See Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We infer from [the]
term [available] that Congress did not intend to require the exhaustion of unavailable
remedies.").
289. See, e.g., Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (noting that prisoners would be able to enter federal court "easily" and this
would "do little to stem the tide of meritless prisoner cases" (internal quotation marks
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evidence, however, of such an effect arising from this narrow
exception. First, a high percentage of prisoners' suits seek at least
some injunctive relief.29° Since the exception applies only to those
cases seeking solely monetary relief,29 it would thus apply to a low
percentage of prisoners' suits. In addition, even if the "flood-gate"
fear becomes reality and prisoners begin to modify their claims so as
to qualify for the exception, the PLRA's other safeguards against
frivolous lawsuits would still have effect. 21 The Supreme Court
recently listed these safeguards against frivolous litigation (without
mentioning the exhaustion requirement):
[T]he statute requires all inmates to pay filing fees; denies in forma
pauperis status to prisoners with three or more prior "strikes"...;
bars suits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior
showing of physical injury; limits attorney's fees; directs district
courts to screen prisoners' complaints before docketing and
authorizes the court on its own motion to dismiss "frivolous,"
"malicious," or meritless actions; permits the revocation of good
time credits for federal prisoners who file malicious or false claims;
and encourages hearings by telecommunication or in prison facilities
to make it unnecessary
for inmate plaintiffs to leave prison for
293
pretrial proceedings.

It is hard to imagine that, with all of these restrictions on prisoners'
ability to file frivolous lawsuits, allowing the proposed limited
exception would create the apocalyptic result feared by some courts.
Not only is there no evidence to suggest that providing an exception
to the exhaustion requirement in these limited cases will result in an
increase in frivolous lawsuits, the exception may eventually reduce the
omitted)).
290. Turner, supra note 51, at 623.
291. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that -[n]o court of
appeals interpreting the PLRA has recognized a futility exception to § 1997e(a)'s
exhaustion requirement in a mixed claim case").
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (g) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring affidavit affirming
belief in entitlement to redress and barring suit where three previous claims have
been dismissed as frivolous); id. § 1932(1)-(3) (allowing courts to revoke inmates'
earned release credit for filing malicious or false suits); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (Supp.
IV 1998) (prescribing dismissal of actions the court deems frivolous); see also Nicholas
v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Congress concluded that one means of
[deterring frivolous lawsuits] would be to require prisoners seeking in forma pauperis
appellate status to pay.., the normal filing fee .... ); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp.
1318, 1321 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (addressing § 1997e and noting that it is one of "various
ways civil litigation filed by prisoners" is limited); Kuzinski, supra note 23, at 385
(describing the three strikes provision as preventing frivolous lawsuits by creating a
disincentive to sue).
293. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1998).
294. See, e.g., Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999)
(musing that if an exception were allowed "§ 1997e would not be worth much");
Vasquez v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 8427, 1999 WL 440631, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1999)
("[Elxempting monetary relief claims from the exhaustion requirement would render
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement meaningless.").
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number of lawsuits by making administrative procedures more
efficient. Prisoners' suits that enter federal court burden the
defendant governments with a tremendous cost.2 9 An exhaustion
requirement is therefore in the best interests of the correctional
institutions. 96 Thus, if an exception exists for cases in which the
grievance system provides no money damages, agencies may seek to
modify their programs to include some form of monetary relief.
As long as prisoners have access to some monetary relief, the
exhaustion requirement should apply.297 Prisoners would be required
to exhaust grievance mechanisms even if potential awards are capped
below the amount sought.298 In Hessbrook v. Lennon,299 for example,

the Fifth Circuit applied the exhaustion requirement of the FTCA
despite the plaintiff's claim of money damages exceeding the Federal
Bureau of Prison's $2,500 limit on monetary awards. 0° The court
explained that the "mere allegation of a larger amount of money
damages on the face of a complaint does not of necessity preclude the
possibility, were an administrative remedy first pursued, that a
satisfactory settlement within the limitations amounts would be
reached." '' Thus, hypothetically, even if a state prison grievance
system's limit on monetary awards were as low as $150 or $200, simply
claiming a higher amount in damages would not permit a sidestep of
the requirement. Including some money damages would, however,
provide the possibility that the petitioner's claim could be settled at
the administrative level.
Such modifications will also benefit courts because fair and effective
grievance procedures maximize the advantages of the exhaustion
doctrine. 32 When grievance procedures provide effective remedies,
plaintiffs are able to obtain more meaningful relief and thus more
claims are satisfied. Fewer cases will then have cause to continue
subsequently into court.
295. See 142 Cong. Rec. 16, 23255 (1996) (citing the estimation of the National
Association of Attorneys General that states spend eighty-one million dollars on
prisoner litigation); Kuzinski, supra note 23, at 368 (asserting that defending frivolous
lawsuits brought by prisoners "consumes time and wastes precious state resources").
296. Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of GrievanceProceduresfor State Prisoners Under
Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 935, 954 (1986) (concluding that

"[sitates and state correctional institutions have much to gain by adopting a fair and
effective grievance system"); Resolving Prisoners' Grievances,supra note 156, at 1327
(stating that effective exhaustion schemes "offer[]... an opportunity to reduce the

expense of defending prisoner suits in court, limit interference by federal courts in the
operation of their corrections systems, and achieve 'greater self-determination"').
297. See Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir. 1985).
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Resolving Prisoners' Grievances, supra note 156, at 1327; see also supra
notes 120-31 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of the exhaustion
doctrine).
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Further, because prisoners perceive more complete grievance
procedures as being more fair, they may be less likely to bring their
suit to court after exhaustion even when unsuccessful at the
administrative level. 3 Commentators have argued that the most
important aspect of a productive grievance system is the level of trust
between the prisoners and the administration:' As the Nyhuis court
observed, a "cooperative ethos" between inmates and the prison
administration will make the administrative process most effective?.
However, "to serve these purposes, grievance procedures must be
understandable to the prisoner, expeditious, and treated seriously.""
Providing an incentive for correctional institutions to make their
grievance procedures more inclusive of prisoners' damages claims can
therefore reduce the number of suits in court-a result consistent with
the stated legislative purpose behind the PLRA.
C. The Exception Can Be Applied With Efficiency
Some courts have suggested that a more narrow exception should
apply when, after determining the nature of the underlying wrong, no
remedies available in the grievance system can effectively cure the
violation.37 One student commentator has specifically advocated this
exception.08 Under this exception, prisoners may avoid exhausting
their claims only if the underlying wrong no longer continues to occur
and money damages are the only satisfactory remedy. : If injunctive
relief can satisfy the claim, the claim must be exhausted
administratively, even if the plaintiff exclusively seeks unavailable
money damages.310
For example, a prisoner who has been beaten by a guard may seek
injunctive relief (an order dismissing the guard), or money damages,
or both.311 Because this suit arises from a "past wrong," an exception
303. See Resolving Prisoners' Grievances, supra note 156, at 1324; see also Keating,
supra note 129, at 13-15 (discussing the importance of credibility in prison grievance

systems).
304. See Celeste F. Bremer et al. "'Fairand Effective" PrisonerGrievance Systems:
Some PracticalSuggestions, 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 41, 45 (1994).
305. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F3d 65, 77 (3d Cir. 2000). The Nyhuis court, however,
reasoned that requiring all plaintiffs to exhaust their claims, whether or not they can
obtain their requested relief, will result in a cooperative relationship between -inmate
and jailer." Id. at 76-77. Intuitively, it seems more likely that inmates will trust the
administrative procedure if it does not ignore the remedy that the),seek.

306. Id at 77.
307. Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 1999); Lunsford v.
Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998).
308. Fiedler, supra note 23, at 719 (proposing that "'courts apply a futility exception
to the exhaustion requirement for both state and federal prisoners that seek damages
for past wrongs").
309. Id at 741-42.
310. Id. at 741.
311. Id at 741-42.
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would apply if the prisoner sues for money damages alone.3 12 If the
prisoner sued for denial of medical attention, however, injunctive
relief (provision of proper medical care) may provide a remedy.'" Denial of medical attention is an "ongoing wrong" and therefore
administrative remedies must be exhausted.314 Thus, this alternative
exception asks the court to determine first whether the nature of the
underlying wrong is "past" or "ongoing" before considering
application of an exception to the exhaustion requirement of
§ 1997e(a).
Distinguishing whether the alleged wrong is "past" or "ongoing,"
however, undesirably forces courts to make a new determination for
each claim within a prisoner's complaint. First, courts sometimes
struggle to determine what the plaintiff alleges.3 5 Categorizing the
claims would be even more difficult. Additionally, because most
complaints contain multiple claims, courts would have to allow an
exception for some claims while forcing the plaintiff to pursue other
claims in the administrative procedure, even though none of the
claims sought available relief. In Whitley,3 6 for example, the prisoner
alleged, among other things, that the prison officials had denied him
needed medical attention for thirteen weeks and had subjected him to
racial discrimination.3 17
The prisoner sought money damages
exclusively-relief he could not obtain from the Bureau of Prisons
grievance procedure.3 18 In Whitley the "denial of medical attention"
would be categorized as a "past wrong" because the prison eventually
corrected its alleged violation (albeit after thirteen weeks). 9 The
racial discrimination claim, however, appears to be based on an
"ongoing" wrong. Racial discrimination could theoretically be cured
by an order firing the responsible administrators and requiring any
racist practices to stop. Thus, even though the plaintiff sought only
money damages for both claims, he could pursue only one claim in
federal court while the other must be exhausted.
An exception to the exhaustion requirement should not create
additional considerations for already-overloaded federal judges.
Courts should allow or decline an exception based on which remedies
the prisoner seeks and what is available in the grievance system.
Therefore, the exception should simply apply when prisoners sue
exclusively for unavailable money damages, regardless of whether the
alleged wrong is "past" or "ongoing."
312.
313.
314.
315.
claims
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
See id. at 741.
See id. at 747.
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Inmate-plaintiffs often file
which are untidy, repetitious, and redolent of legal language.").
158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 884
Id. at 885.
Id. at 884.
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D. Policy ConsiderationsSupport an Exception
Finally, reading § 1997e(a) to be inapplicable where prisoners seek
unavailable money damages is consistent with sound policy for the
protection of prisoners' rights. Although recognition of prisoners'
rights has generally expanded significantly over the last century, the
recent trend has been toward restriction." These restrictions have
aimed to reduce the high number of non-meritorious suits in federal
court.
The heavy volume and frivolousness of prisoners' suits
notwithstanding, prisoners' rights to enforce their constitutional
guarantees should not be restricted in the interest of easing the federal
dockets.32 Although liberty and privacy rights held by prisoners are
limited,311 prisoners retain significant constitutional protections, such
as the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.3" It is true, as courts have noted, that many
constitutional claims can be satisfied with injunctive relief provided by
prison grievance procedures. 32 4 As the Seventh Circuit explained in
Perez, however, injunctive relief may not be enough in all cases, such
as where a prisoner has been harmed and the injury has already
healed. 32 An exhaustion requirement that prevents a plaintiff from
pursuing the only appropriate remedy restricts his ability to enforce
his legal rights. Recognizing a limited exception would therefore
safeguard the rights of prisoners by requiring that the administrative
procedures that prisoners must exhaust are more complete."
In addition, more complete and responsive administrative systems
may reduce hostility towards prisoner litigation by satisfying more
claims before they reach court (and the public eye). As the Supreme
Court places restrictions on prisoners' legal rights, the view that
prisoners do not deserve our attention proliferates. Current public
sentiment toward prisoners characterizes them as litigation-happy
freeloaders "inundat[ing] the beleaguered federal courts with
320. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
321. See Roberta Goodman Mandel, Prisoner Civil Rights: The Need for the
Implementation of Adequate Inmate Grievance Mechanisms, Fla. BJ., June 1992, at
91, 92-93.
322. See O'Bryan, supra note 23, at 1201.
323. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
324. See, e.g., Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1999)

(rejecting an exhaustion requirement exception where money damages were sought
because the agency can provide "money's worth" in injunctive relief) Alexander v.
Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that even if money damages are
sought, the administrative procedure can "halt the infringing practice, which at least
freezes the time frame for the prisoner's damages").
325. Perez, 182 F.3d at 538.
326. See Resolving Prisoners' Grievances, supra note 156, at 1328 ("An unfair
system will be effective neither in resolving complaints nor in reducing federal court
filings, but will operate merely as a barrier that prisoners must overcome to get to
court.")
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frivolous lawsuits complaining about whether the peanut butter they
are served is chunky or creamy. 3 27 This perception of prisoner
litigation has resulted in hostility toward the entire category of
lawsuits, even though accounts of volume and frivolousness are
misrepresented, exaggerated, and sometimes wrong.2 8

Congress'

deletion

of the requirement

procedures
''330 be "plain, speedy, and effective

"animus

' 32 9

that

administrative

is a by-product of the

toward prisoners' rights. In its haste to enact a symbolic

statute addressing the overloaded federal docket, Congress was

willing to forgo requirements that administrative procedures be fair.
In general, "[t]he PLRA drafters seem to favor the risk that
substantial claims will be kept out of court over the risk that nonsubstantial claims will be let in. '331 Sound public policy demands,
however, that administrative exhaustion requirements be subject to
considerations of fundamental fairness, including the existence of
available remedies.332
While the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies can have a positive impact on prisoners' civil
rights litigation, "[a]n unfair [grievance] system will be effective
neither in resolving complaints nor in reducing federal court filings,
but will operate
merely as a barrier that prisoners must overcome to
3 33
get to court.1

CONCLUSION

In enacting the PLRA, Congress responded to overblown images of
frivolous lawsuits brought by prisoners, and the resulting negative
public perception of prisoner litigation in general. 3 4 By relying on
327. Herman, supra note 11, at 1230.
328. See Newman, supra note 76, at 520-22 (debunking myths about prisoners'
lawsuits); supra Part I.B.
329. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994).
330. Herman, supra note 11, at 1231.
331. Id. at 1284.
332. A comparison to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms proves helpful
here. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(applying minimum requirements for lawful mandatory arbitration agreements
between an employer and employee, including, inter alia, provision of all the types of
relief that would otherwise be available in court). Like prisoners, employees subject
to mandatory arbitration agreements must enter the employer's grievance mechanism
instead of filing suit in court. However, courts will not enforce such agreements if
plaintiffs cannot obtain, through arbitration, the remedies available to them in court.
See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000)
(declaring a mandatory arbitration clause against "public policy" because the
employees were subject to the employer's limited range of available remedies). For
an analysis of mandatory arbitration clauses, see David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the
Bath Water, and ConstructingA New Sink in the Process,2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L.
73, 75 (1999).
333. See Resolving Prisoners'Grievances, supra note 156, at 1328.
334. See supra Part I.B.
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inaccuracies and myths, Congress avoided a thorough legislative
process, and consequently, the statute emerged with areas of
ambiguity and conflict.335 As one
3 court has noted: "[Cloncerns with
this new legislation are myriad." The Supreme Court should settle the current conflict concerning
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by allowing a limited exception
for suits seeking only one type of remedy-that which is unavailable
in the administrative procedure. The Court should clarify that the
statute means what it says: only "available" remedies must be

exhausted.337 Reading the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to apply

where the plaintiff's requested remedy is not available is not
supported by the statutory language, specific legislative intent, or
sound public policy. 3- Requiring prisoners to exhaust inadequate
prison grievance procedures places before them an obstacle that is
unwarranted and unsupported by the PLRA.
Providing an exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement
where money damages are unavailable will protect prisoners' rights by
allowing courts to ensure that the requirement is fairly applied and
will create an incentive for prisons to make their grievance procedures
more equitable for inmates. 3 9 Application of the requirement to
unavailable remedies overextends the statute and adds to the
numerous obstacles prisoner litigants already face. As Justice
Brennan explained: "Prisons are too often shielded from public view;
there is no need to make them virtually invisible.' - "

335. See supra Part I.C.

336. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
337. See supra notes 253-74 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Part III.

339. See supra notes 295-306 and accompanying text.
340. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 358 (1987) (Brennan,
dissenting).
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